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A. In the past 30 years, microfinance has carried many promises of social and
economic transformation, with the shift towards targeting women being seen as a major
strategic move through which the promise of social development could be most effectively
delivered. However, ethnographic studies have shown that many women relinquish the
use of their loans to male members of the household, belying the empowering promise
of microfinance. We propose a simple model of household bargaining which examines
how providing women with credit affects production and decision-making power in the
household. Following Bergstrom (1996), we account for the roles of both divorce and
non-cooperation in the household as relevant fall-back options in the bargaining strategy
of each spouse. We show that the introduction of a microcredit programme is likely
to have widely heterogeneous impacts, and can adversely affect the bargaining power
of some women. We demonstrate that access to credit allows a woman to strengthen
her bargaining position through an expansion of her autonomous activities (the causal
mechanism hoped for) in a limited number of cases: when she is able to invest her new
capital profitably in an autonomous activity, and her husband has no alternative activity
in which the same capital would generate comparable returns, or lacks the power to
overrule her preferred investment choice. The case in which the availability of credit is
most likely to strengthen women’s bargaining position in the household is when capital
can be invested in a cooperative activity in which both spouses contribute in an important
way.
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In the past 30 years, microfinance has carried many promises of social and economic trans-
formation, with the shift towards targeting women being seen as a major strategic move
through which the promise of social development could be most effectively delivered. It
is argued that enabling women to generate their own independent income would help tip
the balance of power within the household in their favour and allow them to negotiate a
larger share of household resources. Because women are more likely than men to invest in
household public goods, enlarging the scope for women’s (as opposed to men’s) employ-
ment through access to microcredit is believed to be the most effective channel to deliver
wider social benefits (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005, Khandker 2003, Pitt et
al. 2006).1
This virtuous sequence of events linking targeting women for the delivery of credit to
poverty alleviation is premised on women’s enhanced ability to exert greater autonomous
control over resources and has been justified on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
Empirically, a substantial and growing body of evidence has shown that increasing re-
sources in the hands of women (rather than men’s) has greater impacts on family welfare,
in particular children’s health (child survival and nutrition rates) and education (Duflo
2005, World Bank 2001).2 This social motive for targeting women has been a strong moti-
vation behind poverty-oriented microfinance programmes such as FINCA or the Grameen
Bank.3
1In addition, because women are believed to be more risk-averse, easier to monitor, and more amenable
to the threat of social sanctions than men, targeting women would also contribute to the financial sus-
tainability of microfinance programmes as evidenced by women’s higher repayment rates compared to
men’s. See Cull, Demirguc-Kunt and Morduch (2008) for a recent overview of the financial sustainability
debate.
2Note Edmonds (2005)’s contrary finding that children aged 13 to 17 were more likely to attend school
when they lived with a eligible male recipient of a new pension transfer, than when they lived with an
eligible female recipient.
3Susan Davis, chair of US -based Grameen Foundation explained “There has been re-
search that shows that when women make financial decisions, greater disposable income
goes into improved nutrition, health status, and housing for their children and fam-
ilies. That’s why the industry shifted. When Grameen started, it was just trying
to reach 50-50 parity between men and women, but then they noticed the difference.”
http://knowledge.allianz.com/en/globalissues/microfinance/microcredit/davis_microfinance_women_grameen.htm
Accessed October 8, 2008. For FINCA, whose borrowers are 70 percent women, see
http://www.gdrc.org/icm/finca/finca-2.html. Accessed on October 8, 2008.
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Analytically, the foundations for such an approach can be found in bargaining models of
the household which posit that household members can obtain a greater share of household
resources by improving their fall-back options. Threat or fall-back options capture the
level of welfare available to each spouse in case of a breakdown in the bargaining process
taking place in the household. The empowering effect of microfinance programmes is
expected to materialise through their effects on two types of fall-back options: the utility
levels attained by each spouse in case of divorce or exit from the marriage; and the utility
levels attained when each spouse retreats to an autonomous sphere within the household.
In keeping with this theoretical literature, proxies used in the empirical literature to
measure relative bargaining power in the households include assets brought at marriage,
unearned income, or inherited assets, over which each spouse retains separate control
within marriage, or exogenous policies that affect men and women’s outside options such
as divorce or employment laws (Adam et al. 2003, Fafchamps et al. 2006, Thomas et
al. 2002). All (explicitly or implicitly) take the view that greater family welfare can be
attained by increasing women’s autonomous control over resources.
However, transferring the above reasoning to microfinance is far from straightforward.
While women may readily keep control over cash benefits transferred to them, by con-
trast, loans enter a complex decision-making process with perplexing impacts on the
outcomes of the bargaining process.4 In particular, there is congruent evidence that many
women relinquish the use of their loans, in part or in whole, to their spouses (Goetz and
Gupta 1996, Kabeer 2001, Rahman 1999). For instance, in an ethnographic study of the
operations of Grameen Bank in a Bangladeshi village, Rahman (2001) showed that 78
percent of loans granted to women were used by male members of the household (i.e.
their husbands or sons). Similarly, Goetz and Gupta (1996) report that 56 percent of
loans borrowed by women were invested in male activities. In a study of a group lending
programme conducted by one of us in Kyrgyzstan, almost all group loans (97.5 percent),
irrespective of the gender of the borrower, were allocated to livestock breeding, an activity
traditionally controlled by men with some inputs by women (Ngo 2008).
The fact that women pass on their loans to male members of the household has been
interpreted by some as evidence of women losing control over their loans, casting doubt
on the empowering potential of microfinance. The focus is on women as primary decision-
makers and having autonomous control over loans use and/or loan management.
4See Rutherford (2002) for an ethnographic account of the complexity of the financial (loans and
savings) portfolio handled by low-income households in Bangladesh.
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The observation that women often relinquish their loans to their husbands has led some
theoreticians to argue that, in some instances, it may be in the strategic interest of women
borrowers to do so. Ligon (2002) observes that even if a woman is able to invest a loan
profitably in an autonomous activity, her bargaining position in the household may be
weakened if the initiative causes her autonomous income to become more uncertain. In
this case, she would be better off handing over the loan money to her husband rather than
investing it herself. Van Tassel (2004) offers the explanation that relinquishing control of
the loan is a way of ensuring that the husband would help to repay the debt and thereby
secure access to future credit in the event that the current loan project fails.5
Another interpretation has been proposed by Kabeer (1998, 2001), who argues that women
placed in situations of unequal interdependence within the family, and with limited options
outside of marriage, may prefer interventions that strengthen the household as a whole
rather than seek to improve their individual situations. As Kabeer explained:
“[Women had] a much stronger stake in strengthening cooperation, and minimiz-
ing conflict within the family. Unequal interdependence within the family, and
women’s greater vulnerability outside it, explain why the women loanees sought
greater equality within the family as a result of their access to credit rather
than greater independence from it. It explains, for instance, the significance they
invested in their ability to bring a valued resource into the household and to
contribute directly to household income.”
The scope for women to invest capital in purely autonomous activities is clearly circum-
scribed by gender norms that delineate the division of labour and responsibilities between
men and women in the household and the wider community.6 For instance, social con-
ventions and gender norms regarding the divisions of labour may oblige women to remain
near the home to take care of children, or restrain their ability to travel to markets. These
5More specifically, Van Tassel posits that the husband has a preference for more risky investments than
the wife, and, in fact, would not find it worthwhile to renew the loan to invest in the wife’s preferred
safe project. Therefore, the husband has no incentive to repay the current loan to ensure the household’s
access to future credit if future investments will always be made in the safe project. By transferring
control, the woman effectively provides a guarantee that future investments will be in the risky project,
thereby giving the husband the incentive to assist in repaying the current debt. We should note that
there is some inconsistency in Van Tassel’s formulation of control rights within the household, because
even when the woman gives up control of the loan, she is assumed to retain ownership of the profits from
the investment.
6This perspective appears most clearly from ethnographic studies of microfinance, which are rich in
contextual details. See Johnson (2004), Kabeer (1998), Kabeer (2001), Mayoux (1999), Rahman (1999).
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constraints explain why women are limited to fewer and less profitable business ventures
than men (de Mel et al. 2007, 2008, Emran et al. 2006, Johnson 2004, Johnston and
Morduch 2007).7 Unequal interdependence between spouses also explains why women are
more dependent on the contribution of male household members for the conduct of their
businesses than men are on women’s inputs. Limitations on women’s self-employment
opportunities has been widely documented. For example, in Bangladesh, where the prac-
tice of purdah puts considerable limits on women’s mobility in the public space, women
who invest their loans in their own activities remain bound to home-based activities (e.g.
poultry or milk cow rearing) in line with traditions stipulating that these activities are
managed by women. Loans used by men and women in joint enterprises also retain the
same gender structure, for example with women making puffed rice or sweet, which are
then sold by their husbands (Anderson and Eswaran 2007, Hashemi et al. 1996, Kabeer
1998).
To disentangle how microcredit programmes targeted at women can be expected to shift
the balance of power in the household, we develop a simple model of household bargaining
where we (i) allow for cooperative endeavours in production between the husband and
the wife, and the possibility of investing the loan in such endeavours; (ii) account for
the roles of both non-cooperation and the threat of divorce in the bargaining process,
and acknowledge that social norms may limit (in different ways) the range of entrepre-
neurial activity that may be undertaken in marriage and following divorce. Following
Bergstrom (1996), we propose a model which accounts for the role of both divorce and
non-cooperation in the household as relevant fall-back options in the bargaining strategy
of each spouse. Our model contrasts with axiomatic models of intrahousehold bargaining,
which solve the bargaining problem by assuming ex-ante what the relevant threat point
will be (Lundberg and Pollak 1993, Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981).
Our approach differs from those of Van Tassel (2004) and Ligon (2002) in that, rather than
assuming a binary choice for the use of credit, we allow for its use in a cooperative sphere
of production; and distinguish between the possible uses of credit within and outside of
marriage. On the other hand, we abstract away from the issue of risky investments and
their implications for household bargaining, which has received careful attention in these
studies.
7In a recent study on the profitability of micro-enterprises in Sri Lanka, De Mel, McKenzie and
Woodruff (2008) find that mean returns to capital are zero among female-owned enterprises and that
more than half of the enterprises owned by women have negative returns, compared to 20 percent for
men.
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Our modelling choice allows us to explore the possibility of heterogeneous impacts across
households of microcredit programmes targeted at women borrowers. Thus, we are able
to address one of the key questions within the current debate on women’s empowerment
and microfinance today: namely, under what conditions, if any, can a policy of targeting
women in microcredit programmes, improve their decision-making power and control of re-
sources within the household? We believe that this key policy-related question for research
on microfinance and gender empowerment today has not received adequate attention in
the existing theoretical literature. Van Tassel (2004) and Ligon (2002) focus, instead, on
two specific puzzles from the early experience of microfinance institutions; namely, the
substantially higher rates of repayment achieved by targeting women borrowers, and the
relinquishment of loans by women borrowers to their spouses.
Given the limits on women’s ability to earn an independent income, we pay particular
attention to how access to a new resource that enlarges the scope for cooperation in the
household affect the relative bargaining power of spouses. Our focus on cooperation in the
household echoes recent concerns about the consequences of excluding men in microfinance
(Armendariz de Aghion and Roome 2008) or health (Mullany et al. 2005) programmes,
when their participation is important for programme success. Since production decisions
regarding loan use affect the fall-back options of the spouses, we also explore the situation
when the male spouse may have an incentive to appropriate the loan to maintain his own
bargaining power within the household.
We find that access to credit allows a woman to strengthen her bargaining position through
an expansion of her autonomous activities only under very specific circumstances: when
the woman is able to invest her new capital profitably in an autonomous activity and her
husband has no alternative activity in which the same capital would generate comparable
returns. The case in which the availability of credit is most likely to strengthen women’s
bargaining position in the household is when capital can be invested in a cooperative
activity in which both spouses contribute in an important way. We also show that the
impact of any type of intervention depends critically on whether or not divorce is a credible
threat point.
The next section sets up our model of household bargaining and interprets it in the context
of an intervention providing women with access to new capital. We then represent and
distinguish between four types of intrahousehold relations and predict how access to credit
affects production and bargaining power in the household in each case. We illustrate the
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model’s predictions by drawing on ethnographic studies of the outcomes of microfinance
programmes. Section 3 concludes with further discussions of our theoretical results.
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Empirical studies have shown that in many societies, divorce carries a particularly high
cost and non-cooperation within the household constitutes a more credible threat-point
than divorce for most women. This insight was prominently put forward by Lundberg
and Pollack (1994), who define the non-cooperative threat point as a "division of labour
based on socially recognized and sanctioned gender roles". Short of marriage dissolution,
spouses retreat to ’separate spheres’ within the marriage where they each fulfill their
gender roles and where the non-cooperative equilibrium is determined by each spouse’s
voluntary contributions to household public goods (Lundberg and Pollak 1993).8
Choosing the relevant threat point has important implications regarding the prediction
of household bargaining models. Predictions from divorce-threat bargaining models differ
considerably from models that posit non-cooperation as the fall-back option (Adam et al.
2003, Anderson and Eswaran 2007, Pollack 1994). For example, Anderson and Eswaran
(2007) are able to reject the prediction from divorce-threat bargaining models that un-
earned income has a greater impact than earned income on women’s bargaining power
in Bangladesh, where divorce is highly uncommon. Instead, in line with predictions from
bargaining models using non-cooperation as the relevant threat point, they argue that it
is the control that women exert over their own earnings in the non-cooperative outcome
that can shift the balance of power within the household. Relatedly, they show that there
is no difference between pure housewives (who do not contribute to household income)
and women working on their husbands’ farms because the latter do not exert control over
the income generated from their labour.
Nevertheless, in our theoretical analysis of decision-making within the household, we al-
low for both non-cooperation and exit as strategic options in the bargaining process.
There are a number of reasons for taking this approach. First, empirical tests of the
divorce-threat model versus the separate spheres model are conducted at the mean; this
8In traditional patriarchal societies, this involves women meeting their traditional obligations as moth-
ers, wives, and daughters-in-law such as child-bearing and performing household chores. For men, this
includes fulfilling their roles as primary breadwinners and meeting their obligations towards their parents,
community and kinship group.
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does not preclude the possibility that, in specific instances, the woman’s exit option does
impact upon negotiated decisions within the household. Given our concern with hetero-
geneous outcomes within households from the introduction of a microcredit programme,
our theoretical analysis must take this possibility seriously. Second, the terms of non-
cooperation may differ substantially between households in developed countries and in
developing countries with strongly patriarchal norms. In the latter case, a certain level
of violence against women by their husbands may be deemed socially permissible and,
therefore, the threat of violence or actual violence may be used in the bargaining process
. The possibility of violence under non-cooperation can imply that, in certain instances,
leaving the marriage is a realistic option (even if it is not actually undertaken).9 Third,
while the incidence of divorce in these societies may be low, the incidence of separation
initiated by the wife, precisely in situations where she has been subject to or threatened
with violence, is substantially higher.
We differentiate between the scope for autonomous activities within marriage, and in-
come opportunities following exit. If an individual, especially a woman, relies on the
support and resources available to her as a consequence of her status or position within
the community for her autonomous household activity, then she may not have the same
opportunities upon exiting the marriage. It is also possible that a woman is constrained
in terms of the type of economic activities she can undertake within a marriage because
of social conventions, and has more options available to her if she leaves the marriage and
is no longer obliged to follow these conventions.
This distinction between opportunities within and outside of marriage also has important
implications for credit. A loan taken by the household may be invested in a female
activity, but it does not necessarily follow that the woman would be able to retain control
of the new asset or enterprise if she leaves the marriage.10 On the other hand, a woman
may have little scope of investing a loan profitably while she remains married — in which
9In the context of Bangladesh, the social acceptability of violence against women by their husbands has
been documented in various ethnographic studies; e.g. Hartmann and Boyce (1983) and White (1992).
The use of the domestic violence as a bargaining tool has been documented by Rahman (1999). Bloch and
Rao (2001) provide econometric and qualitative evidence, using data from three South Indian villages,
that domestic violence against women is being used strategically by their husbands to extract transfers
from the wives’ parents.
10Bina Agarwal argues that, traditionally, women in South Asia have had very weak property rights,
both in the written law and in practice, and that divorced women, even those from very prosperous
households, many find themselves in a state of destitution because of their lack of independent rights in
property (Agarwal, 1994). Whether women may have stronger de facto rights to property acquired with
loans given to them by MFIs remains an open question.
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case, the loan may be invested in a male or cooperative activity or the household may
not participate in the loan programme at all — but the existence of the programme may
nevertheless improve her exit option. The exact nature of the impact would depend on
the economic opportunites within the community and the socially defined gender norms
regarding these opportunities; as well as on the specific skills of the household members.
For these reasons, participation in a credit programme need not affect the income oppor-
tunities of the spouses following exit; while the availability of a credit programme may
improve the spouses’ exit options even if it is not used to make investments in autonomous
activities within the marriage.
We model bargaining within the household as a game of alternating offers with both
divorce (also referred herein as the exit or outside option) and non-cooperation within the
household (in the definition proposed by Lundberg and Pollak recalled above) as relevant
fall-back options.11 In the following section, we develop the model and discuss its main
insights in the context of development interventions that seek to shift the balance of power
within the household with the aim of achieving broader societal transformations.
2.1. A Bargaining Model of the Household. Imagine a household consisting of a
husband, h and a wifew. They can engage in production in a number of different activities,
represented by the set S. Each productive activity requires assets that are specific to
that activity — for example, a husking machine for husking paddy — and so we represent
household assets by a vector k =(k1, .., kS), where ks is the value of assets specific to
activity s. Each activity also involves performing various tasks that, because of the
prevailing gender-related norms, can only be performed by a man, while others can only
be performed by a woman. Therefore, a unit of effective labour by the husband in an
activity is not equivalent to a unit of effective labour by the wife, and output depends on
the specific levels of each. Each spouse is endowed with one unit of labour per period.
Formally, output in activity s is given by
ys = gs (ks, ls)
ls = γs
(
lhs
)θs
(lws )
1−θs
11Kanbur and Haddad (1994) propose a similar model of household bargaining and touch upon some
of the results discussed here. However, given our focus on microfinance interventions and gender empow-
erment, our interpretation of the model and the results are considerably different from those of Kanbur
and Haddad (who consider the question whether households grow more or less equal as they grow richer).
Moreover, our analysis is carried out in a more general setting.
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where lhs , l
w
s measure the labour input by the husband and the wife, respectively, in activity
s .The parameter θs captures the relative importance of male and female labour, and γs
the combined skill level of the couple, in the activity concerned. We assume gs (.) is weakly
increasing and concave in both inputs.
Since we wish to examine the effects of credit on bargaining and cooperation within
the household, we consider the case where the household has three productive activities:
S = {m, f, c} , θm = 1, θf = 0, θc ∈ (0, 1) (the letters stand for ‘male’, ‘female’ and
‘cooperative’). Thus, the husband and wife can undertake production independently in
activities m and f respectively, but some labour input from both is required for positive
output in activity c.
At the end of production, total household income is given by y =
∑
s∈S ys (we assume,
for ease of notation, that each output has a price of 1). In this section, we assume that
the income is spent on a single consumer good, which can be consumed privately by
either h or w. Both spouses derive utility from own consumption only. Furthermore,
utility from consumption of the private good exhibits constant absolute risk aversion:
U i (x) = − exp (−rix), a functional form that allows for the Nash bargaining solution to
be computed with ease. Furthermore, for ease of exposition, we let rh = rw.12. These
simplying assumptions are made primarily to illustrate the basic properties of the bargain-
ing game. In section 2.3, and for the subsequent analysis relating to credit, we consider
a more general setting for household consumption, allowing for n different consumption
goods, which may include both private and household public goods.
The husband and the wife have control rights over the output from activities m and f
respectively. Either spouse may have full control rights over output in activity c, without
affecting our analysis: as the spouse without control rights would refuse to provide labour
for this activity, output would equal zero. Therefore, in the absence of an agreement about
the allocation of labour and expenditures, each spouse devotes all her labour to her own
activity, and uses the resulting income for private consumption. The autarkic incomes
12We feel there is no loss of understanding from these simplifying assumptions as the effect of risk-
aversion on bargaining is well-understood from previous work: Roth (1979) and Kihlstrom, Roth and
Schmeidler (1981) have shown that increasing an agent’s aversion to risk lowers his share in the outcome of
bargaining. Therefore, if one spouse is more risk-averse, then he or she would do worse in the bargaining
game. If utility exhibited decreasing absolute risk aversion, then providing additional income to one
spouse would strengthen his bargaining position because of a decrease in risk-aversion, independently of
any effect on his threat point.
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and expenditures are given by yha = gm (km, γm) , y
w
a = gf
(
kf , γf
)
. This corresponds to
the outcome described as ‘separate spheres’ by Lundberg and Pollak (1993).
Although h and w would also engage in autonomous production in the event of divorce,
their incomes in this case need not correspond to their ‘separate spheres’ incomes. This
is because social norms may impose (or relax) constraints on the types of assets that they
can control and the types of activities they can undertake within a marriage. Therefore,
we represent income levels following divorce by a different set of variables, ye =
(
yhe , y
w
e
)
.
To model the process whereby the couple reach an agreement, we make use of the house-
hold bargaining game proposed by Bergstrom (1996) and Kanbur and Haddad (1994).
The husband and wife can propose an allocation of labour and consumption expenditures
in alternate periods, which the spouse can then accept or refuse. If an offer is accepted,
then it becomes the standing agreement according to which resources are allocated within
the household thereafter, unless it is rejected by the spouse in a subsequent period. When
there is no standing agreement, the spouses allocate labour and spend their incomes in-
dependently. In addition, either spouse i may choose to walk away from the marriage
in any period (before production takes place), in which case he or she would receive the
income yie in each period thereafter (once the marriage has broken down, there is no scope
of renegotiation possible).
Formally, suppose h makes offers in periods 2t − 1 and w makes offers in periods 2t, for
t = 1, 2, ...∞. There are three stages of decision-making within each period as follows:
Stage 1: If there was no agreement in place in the previous period, then the current
offerer can propose an allocation of labour
(
lhs , l
w
s
)
s∈S
and shares in total expenditure for
each spouse (α, 1− α). This then becomes the ‘standing offer’. Alternatively, the current
offerer can choose to exit the marriage at this stage.
Stage 2: If there was an agreement in place in the previous period or a standing offer,
then the spouse of the offerer must choose whether to (continue to) accept or reject it. If
the offer or agreement is rejected, there is no agreement for the remainder of the period.
If it is accepted, then there is an agreement in place corresponding to the ‘standing offer’
or previous agreement. Alternatively, the spouse can choose to exit the marriage at this
stage.
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Stage 3: If there is an agreement in place, then resources are allocated according to
the agreement. If not, then the spouses individually choose to allocate labour across
productive activities, and spend the incomes over which they have control rights.
In the description above, we have assumed, implicitly, that when a couple come to an
agreement, they are able to commit to divide the income generated from the cooperative
activity at the end of production process in accordance with the income shares agreed
upon13. Under this assumption, any rational proposal will involve an efficient allocation of
labour resources within the household; because an offer that involves an efficient allocation
of labour can always be made more attractive to both spouses than another which does
not. Thus, the total household income in any cooperative agreement will be given by the
following maximisation problem:
(1) y (k,γ) = max
(lhs ,lws )
s∈S
∑
s∈S
gs
(
ks, γs
(
lhs
)θs
(lws )
1−θs
)
subject to ∑
s∈S
lis ≤ 1 for i = h, w
where k =(km, kf , kc) ,γ =
(
γm, γf , γc
)
.
Thus, the only substantive issue to be decided upon in the bargaining process is how the
income y(k,γ) will be divided between the spouses. In effect, we have here the bargain-
ing game analysed by Rubinstein (1982) with the modification introduced by Binmore
(1985)14. Binmore showed that the two parties reach an agreement immediately and, if
the time lapse between proposals is infinitesimally small, then the total income shares of
the two parties are given by the solution to the following problem:
(2) α (k,γ,ye) = arg max
α∈[0,1]
[
U (αy)− U
(
yha
)]
[U (βy)− U (ywa )]
13This assumption is essential for the spouses to be able to participate in the cooperative activity.
However, they need not be able to commit to make transfers from the income generated by their inde-
pendent activities because any agreement that requires them to do so cannot arise in equilibrium: the
spouse who is required to make such a transfer would be better off under non-cooperation.
14Note that, unlike Rubinstein’s bargaining game, spouses may choose to reject an offer that was
accepted in a preceding period. However, as noted by Bergstorm (1996), it is never optimal for either
spouse to do so. Given the stationary environment, if it is optimal for a spouse to accept an offer in some
period t, it is also optimal to accept the standing agreement corresponding to this offer in subsequent
periods.
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subject to
U (αy) ≥ U
(
yhe
)
U (βy) ≥ U (ywe )
where β = 1−α . Here, α and β are the income shares of the husband and wife respectively.
It is evident from the maximisation problem described in (2) that the utility levels achieved
under non-cooperation and from divorce both influence the outcome of bargaining. For
constant absolute risk aversion utility (and the same degree of risk aversion for both
spouses), the solution to the bargaining problem in (2) takes a simple form:
(3) α (k,γ,ye) =
yhe /y if
1
2
(
1 + y
h
a−y
w
a
y
)
< yhe /y
1− ywe /y if
1
2
(
1 + y
w
a −y
h
a
y
)
< ywe /y
1
2
(
1 + y
h
a−y
w
a
y
)
otherwise
It is evident from (3) that a spouse’s share of total income in the outcome of bargaining
depends on the relative values of incomes under non-cooperation, unless this value falls
below the income attained from leaving the marriage. In the latter case, one receives, in
the bargaining game, exactly the income obtained from exit, while the spouse takes the
rest of total household income. Intuitively, a spouse who can fend for herself in a non-
cooperative household will not be pressured by her partner into accepting an agreement
that is biased against her in exchange of a return to cooperation. By contrast, if she has
little autonomy within the household, she may acquiesce to an unfavourable agreement to
end a conflict. In the second case, a strong exit option protects her from having to suffer
an arrangement that is very biased against her, for when faced with the prospect of such
an arrangement, her divorce option becomes a credible threat.
The axiomatic approach adopted by Lundberg and Pollak (1993) overlooks the role played
by the exit options in the bargaining process when one spouse has little scope of autonomy
within the household. Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981), also
using an axiomatic approach, allow the exit options to affect the outcome of bargaining,
but, as pointed out by Bergstrom (1996), not in the manner that is predicted by non-
cooperative bargaining theory. By explicitly modeling the bargaining process, we are
able to show precisely how both the possibility of non-cooperation and divorce affect
decision-making within the household.
14 THI MINH-PHUONG NGO∗ AND ZAKI WAHHAJ+
2.2. An Interpretation of the Model in the Context of Household Bargaining.
Before considering how this framework may be used to investigate the impact of a mi-
crocredit programme on bargaining power within the household, we discuss briefly how
the ‘male’, ‘female’ and ‘cooperative activities’ and the corresponding parameters γm, γf ,
and γc should be interpreted. Note that the ‘female’ activity is one that the woman is
able carry out within the limits of the socially recognised division of labour for her gen-
der, without the cooperation of her spouse. In the absence of a cooperative agreement,
the gender norms also recognise her right to retain control over this income. In a patri-
archal setting, women may be dependent on men in carrying out their entrepreneurial
activities at least at some stage of production or marketing. In this case, the productive
activity should be classified as ‘cooperative’ within this framework rather than ‘female’.15
Likewise, a productive activity that is carried out primarily by men but relies on some
input from the female spouse, and from which she can credibly threaten to withdraw her
cooperation, should be classified as a ‘cooperative’ rather than a ‘male’ activity.
The parameters γm and γf can serve to capture heterogeneity across households in in-
dividual skill levels in autonomous activities, and γc, the ability of the spouses to work
together in an activity that requires coordination and cooperation. For example, a low
value of γc can represent an extremely conflictual relationship where there is little scope of
cooperation between the spouses. In this case, the spouses are likely to engage in largely
autonomous activities.16 A household where the female spouse has strong entrepreneurial
skills, and can operate an entreprise independently of her husband would be characterised
by a high value of γf .
17 If a woman who has no opportunity for work other than on her
husband’s farm, the household would be characterised by low γf . Moreover, if her input
in farm work is easily substitutable by the man, then θc is close to 1 and γm is close to
γc.
15For example, in the context of Bangladeshi rural households, Goetz and Gupta (1996) note that “the
household is a joint venture, and the gender division of labor is such that full, individual control of the
productive process is virtually impossible for women given the gendered nature of access to markets.”
(p.53)
16This equilibrium is equivalent to the situation described by Kabeer (2001) as “divorce within mar-
riage” (p.74). The spouses remain married because of the social stigma associated with divorce.
17Kabeer (1998) provides a number of examples of women who can be placed in this category. In some
cases, they had overcome traditional gender restrictions: one earned as income as an itinerant trader,
another owned a grocery shop in the main bazaar. Others had found an effective solution within these
restriction such as the woman who reared a cow and sold its milk ’in the neighbourhood’, thus not having
to rely on a male household member for marketing.
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The Impact of a Development Programme on Intra-Household Bargaining:
The model of household bargaining developed in the previous section can be used to
examine the effects of a development intervention that provides households productive
assets or improves the productivity of household members in specific activities. In the case
of a single private consumption good and CARA utility, the impacts are readily apparent
from equation (3). Here, we provide a brief discussion of the comparative statics results
under these assumptions. A more general (and weaker) version of these results will be
presented in the next section.
Comparative Statics Results with CARA utility:
(1) If the divorce threat is not a binding constraint for either spouse, then
(a) an intervention that increases household assets in the cooperative activity,
kc, or increases the household’s productivity in the joint activity, leads to a
decrease in α∗ if α∗ > 1
2
, an increase in α∗ for α∗ < 1
2
, and has no impact on
α∗ if α∗ = 1
2
;
(b) an intervention that increases the level of household productive assets, or
increases productivity, in the male (female) autonomous activity leads to an
increase (decrease) in α∗;
(c) a small increase in the incomes from the exit options, yhe or y
w
e , such that
the divorce threat constraints remain slack, will have no impact on α∗; for
a sufficiently large increase in yie, i ∈ {h, w}, the constraint for spouse i will
begin to bind, and α∗ will shift in favour of this spouse.
(2) If the divorce threat is a binding constraint for the wife, then
(a) an increase in km or γm will lead to an increase in α
∗;
(b) a small increase in ks or γs, for s = f or c, such that the wife’s constraint
continues to bind following the increase, will lead to an increase in α∗; for
sufficiently large increases in these variables, the wife’s constraint becomes
slack and the the impact on α∗ is as described by the results 1(a) and 1(b);
(c) an increase in ywe will lead to a decrease in α
∗; a small increase in yhe will
have no impact on α∗ but a sufficiently large increase in yhe will lead to the
dissolution of marriage.
(3) If the divorce threat constraint is binding for the husband, we obtain the effects
corresponding to those described in part 2.
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The result in 1(b) is well-known from the literature on intra-household bargaining: increas-
ing the scope of autonomy of one spouse yields her a greater share of household resources.
More significantly, the result in 1(a) indicates that an increase in the gains from cooper-
ation also shifts relative bargaining powers within the household (as measured by α∗) in
favour of the more disempowered spouse. 1(c) indicates that for households where the exit
options do not serve as a credible threat in the bargaining process, a small improvement
in income earning opportunities that lie outside the range that is socially approved will
have no impact on welfare or bargaining power within the household.
The results also indicate considerable heterogeneity in impacts across households. Where
the exit option serves as a credible threat, a small increase in the gains of cooperation can
actually decrease the income share of the spouse who is against her participation constraint
(result 2(b)). In addition, a small increase in her range of economic opportunities within
marriage can similarly decrease her share of the surplus from cooperation (result 2(b)).
By contrast, strengthening her exit option will lead to an increase in her share (result
2(c)).
The results in 2(b) have a simple intuitive explanation. When exit from the marriage
becomes a credible threat point, there is, in effect, no more bargaining taking place within
the household. The better-off spouse need only ensure that his partner is receiving just
enough utility within the marriage so as not to opt for her exit option. As the household
becomes richer, it becomes cheaper for him to do so: his partner will be content with
staying in the marriage for an even smaller share of the gains from cooperation.18
2.3. Multiple Consumption Goods. In this section, we extend the analysis to a set-
ting where there are L > 2 consumption goods, including both private and household
public goods. Let p = (p1, p2, .., pL) be the prices of the L goods, and denote by
x =(x1, x2, ..., xL) a consumption bundle which provide utility levels U
h (x) and Uw (x) to
the husband and wife respectively. In this setting, the husband and wife would bargain,
not over income shares but over the level of expenditure on each commodity. However,
the nature of the bargaining game is such that any cooperative agreement agreed upon
will involve an efficient level of expenditures; i.e. given the household budget, the util-
ity levels attained in the agreement will be on the utility possibility frontier. Therefore,
given total household income y, any consumption bundle agreed upon will belong to the
18See Kanbur and Haddad (1994), who find similar results.
MICROFINANCE AND GENDER EMPOWERMENT 17
set {x (y, λ) : λ ∈ (0,∞)} where
(4) x (y, λ) = arg max
p.x≤y
Uh (x) + λUw (x)
Thus, any bargaining solution can be fully summarised by the parameter λ. Here, λ is the
wife’s relative pareto weight, with the husband’s pareto weight being fixed at 1. Note that
x (y, 0) represents the household expenditures that would result if they were decided upon
entirely by the husband, while x (y,∞) represents the expenditures that the wife would
choose on her own. We can say that the husband (wife) has a stronger preference for good
l at income level y if xl (y, 0) > xl (y,∞) (xl (y, 0) < xl (y,∞)). Then it is straightforward
to show that as λ increases, the household spends more on goods for which the wife has a
stronger preference and less on goods for which the husband has a stronger preference at
the given income level. In this sense, λ can be said to capture decision-making authority
or ‘say’ within the household.
To facilitate the analysis of the bargaining game, we define an indirect utility function:
V i (y, λ) = U i (x (y, λ)) for i = h,w
Thus V i (y, λ) is the utility obtained by spouse i in an efficient agreement when total
household income equals y and the wife’s relative pareto weight is λ.
Expenditure levels under non-cooperation would depend on the precise nature of the sub-
game played when expenditure decisions are made non-cooperatively. In particular, Lund-
berg and Pollak (1993) has shown that the equilibrium attained under non-cooperation is
sensitive to presence or absence of separate spheres in consumption and on whether the
spouses can make intra-household transfers. For our purpose, the relevant issue is how
utility levels under non-cooperation respond to changes in autarkic income levels. There-
fore, rather than making explicit the subgame played in non-cooperation, we denote the
utility levels attained by indirect utility functions V˜ i
(
yha , y
w
a
)
, for i = h,w, and consider
each possible case highlighted by Lundberg and Pollak (1993).
Case (i): if there are separate spheres of household expenditures and no possibility of
intra-household transfers under non-cooperation, then V˜ ii > V˜
i
j for j 	= i
19;
19We use V˜ ij to denote
∂V˜ i
∂y
j
a
.
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Case (ii): if there are separate spheres of household expenditures, but intra-household
transfers are possible, and spouse i makes positive transfers to j in equilibrium, then
V˜ ii = V˜
i
j for j 	= i ;
Case (iii): if there are household public goods, and each spouse spends a positive amount
on each household public good, then V˜ ii = V˜
i
j for j 	= i (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993);
Note that, in each of these cases, V˜ ii > 0. As we have argued that the outcome of
bargaining will involve an efficient level of consumption expenditures, the bargaining
solution for the general case is given by the following maximisation problem:
(5) λ (k,γ,ye) = arg max
λ∈(0,∞)
[
V h (y, λ)− V˜ h
(
yha , y
w
a
)] [
V w (y, λ)− V˜ w
(
yha , y
w
a
)]
subject to
V i (y, λ) ≥ Vˆ i
(
yie
)
for i = h,w
where Vˆ i (.) is the indirect utility function for welfare from exiting the marriage.20
We consider, first, the situation where the constraints imposed by the exit option do not
bind. Then λ (k,γ,ye) is given implicitly by the following equation:
(6) λ =
V h (y, λ)− V˜ h
(
yha , y
w
a
)
V w (y, λ)− V˜ w (yha , y
w
a )
Graphically, this solution is given by the point on the utility possibility frontier where
the tangent is perpendicur to the straight line passing through this point and the point
representing the non-cooperative utility levels. To determine how λ responds to a devel-
opment intervention that affects household productivity in the different activities, or to
changes in the level of household assets, we differentiate throughout (6) with respect to
the relevant parameter. Thus, we obtain
(7)
dλ
dυ
≡
yυ
(
V hy − λV
w
y
)
− y˜hv
(
V˜ hh − λV˜
w
h
)
+ y˜wv
(
λV˜ ww − V˜
h
w
)
V w − V˜ w + λV wλ − V
h
λ
where υ = km, γm, kc, γc, kf , or γf .
21 From equation (7), it is possible to distinguish be-
tween two distinct effects of any intervention on decision-making authority within the
household, as measured by λ. The first is an income effect which (ignoring the denomina-
tor which, it can be shown, is always positive) is equal to yυ
(
V hy − λV
w
y
)
. If preferences
can be represented by a CES utility function (of the form U i (x) =
∑
l α
i
l (xl)
ρ), then it
20Formally, Vˆ i
(
yie
)
= maxp.x≤yie U
i (x).
21We use the following abbreviated notation: yυ =
∂y
∂υ
, y˜iυ =
∂y˜iυ
∂υ
, V iy =
∂V i
∂y
, and V iλ =
∂V i
∂λ
.
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can be shown that V hy − λV
w
y  0 for λ  λe (y), where λe (y) is defined implicitly by the
equation λV wy (y, λ) = V
h
y (y, λ) (see proof of Propostion 2.1). In other words, the income
effect causes λ to move towards λe (y). In the case of a symmetric utility possibility set,
λe (y) = 1, and, in this sense, the income effect can be said to make decision-making
authority within the household more egalitarian.
When the intervention is in the cooperative sphere, there is only an income effect on
λ as described above. However, if the intervention is in the male or female sphere of
autonomous activity, there is an additional effect on λ caused by a shift in the non-
cooperative threat point. This ‘threat-point effect’ equals −y˜hv
(
V˜ hh − λV˜
w
h
)
for an in-
tervention targeted at the male activity, and y˜wv
(
λV˜ ww − V˜
h
w
)
when it targets the female
activity (again ignoring the denominator which is the same as in the income effect). It
should be clear from the preceding discussion on the non-cooperative threat point that
the signs of the threat-point effects are ambiguous. Indeed, for cases (ii) and (iii) noted
above, the threat-point effects favour whichever spouse has greater decision-making au-
thority in the initial situation (i.e. it depends on whether λ is smaller or greater than
one) whether the intervention occurs in the male or female activity. This suggests that
an investment in the autonomous sphere of one spouse will not necessarily strengthen her
or his decision-making authority beyond any income effect if that spouse were initially in
a weaker bargaining position. The following proposition summarises the results discussed
here.
Proposition 2.1. Suppose preferences can be represented by a CES utility function. If
the divorce option is not a binding constraint for either spouse in the initial equilibrium,
then
(i) an intervention which leads to an increase in any of the variables km, γm, kc, γc, kf ,
or γf , has two distinct effects on decision-making authority within the household
as measured by λ:
(a) an ‘income effect’ which is smaller than, equal to, or greater than zero de-
pending on whether the initial value of λ is greater than, equal to, or smaller
than λe (y);
(b) a ‘threat-point effect’ which, in the case of an intervention in the male (female)
sphere of activity, is greater than zero if and only if y˜hv
(
V˜ hh − λV˜
w
h
)
< 0
(y˜wv
(
λV˜ ww − V˜
h
w
)
> 0); the effect is absent in the case of a cooperative activity.
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(ii) a small increase in yhe or y
w
e , such that the constraints imposed by the divorce
options continue to be slack, will have no impact on λ; for a sufficiently large
increase in yie, i ∈ {h, w}, the constraint for spouse i will begin to bind, and λ will
shift in favour of this spouse.
Proposition 2.1, which provides a generalisation of ‘Result 1’ in the previous section,
highlights the difference between a development intervention targeted at the cooperative
sphere within the household and one that improves skills or enables capital buildup within
the autonomous sphere of either spouse. In the former case, the intervention produces only
an ’income effect’: since the difference in welfare levels associated with non-cooperative
threat points become smaller in relation to the utility possibility frontier as household
income grows larger, the income effect shifts the household, roughly, closer to a situation
where the spouses attained the same level of welfare under non-cooperation.22 There-
fore, decision-making within the household grows more egalitarian. Raising the income
potential of a spouse under non-cooperation also creates an income effect; but it can
have an additional effect on decision-making authority if it disproportionately affects the
threat-points of the two spouses. Intuitively, raising the autonomous income of one spouse
creates ’spill-overs’ on the welfare of the other spouse under non-cooperation if they both
have strong preferences for certain household public goods; thus, ’threat-point effect’ is
smaller when the household spends a larger share of its budget on household public goods,
as opposed to private goods..
If the divorce threat-point is a binding constraint for either spouse in the initial situation,
the general case, and the underlying intuition corresponds exactly to Results 2 and 3 for
the special case with exponential utility discussed in the previous section. The results are
summarised below.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose the bargaining problem has a corner solution with w receiving
the same utility in the agreement as she would from her exit option. Then,
(i) an increase in km or γm will lead to an increase in λ;
(ii) a small increase in ks or γs, for s = f or c, such that w’s constraint continues to
bind following the increase, will lead to an increase in λ; for sufficiently large increases
in these variables, w’s constraint becomes slack and the the impact on λ is as described
by Proposition 2.1(i).
22This is also a generalisation of a result earlier noted by Kanbur and Haddad (1994).
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(iii) an increase in ywe will lead to a decrease in λ; a small increase in y
h
e will have no
impact on λ but a sufficiently large increase in yhe will lead to the dissolution of marriage.
3. A  C

In section 2.1, it is assumed that the household has no means of acquiring or disposing
off assets. In particular, the household had no means to save, or access to credit, in order
to buy new assets. We now introduce a microcredit programme into this environment,
and examine its effects on household production and decision-making. A loan product
is described by a 4-tuple L = (L, z, n, σ) where L is the size of the loan, which must be
repaid, including interest, in equal installments of z over n periods; and σ ∈ [0, 1] is the
fraction of each loan installment that the husband is obliged to pay in the event that
cooperation between the spouses breaks down. This last parameter may be determined
by the terms of the loan, informal understanding with the bank officer, or by the relevant
social norms.
If the size of the loan is small, and investments are lumpy, say the purchase of a cow
or a plot of land, then it may well be that the loan will be invested exclusively in one
sphere of production within the household. In the subsequent analysis, this is our working
assumption.
The presence of a microcredit programme implies that the household has to decide not
only on the allocation of labour across productive activities and household expenditures,
but also, when a new loan is available, on whether or not to take out a loan and, if they
do, on how to invest the loan. Therefore, we add two additional stages to those introduced
in section 2.1 to model decision-making within each period:
Stage P: If the household has access to a credit programme, each spouse states a pref-
erence, P i ∈ {Y,N} about whether or not to participate. The household’s decision is
determined by the function P
(
P h, Pw
)
: {Y,N} × {Y,N} −→ {Y,N}.
Stage I: If P = Y, then the household receives a loan of size L; and each spouse states
a preference, I i ∈ {m, f, c} about the activity in which the loan money should be in-
vested. The household’s decision is determined by the function I
(
Ih, Iw
)
: {m, f, c} ×
{m, f, c} −→ {m, f, c}. The new level of capital in the activity, s, chosen for investment,
becomes ks + L.
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The functions P (.) and I (.) , which define how the household members’ preferences for
borrowing and investment translate into a collective household decision, will be defined
in the next section.
We assume that there is full enforcement in loan repayment. Therefore, the presence
of an outstanding loan lowers the disposable income of household member i under non-
cooperation to yia − σ
iz in each period. Also, while there is an outstanding debt, a
cooperative agreement specifies how to allocate the total disposable income y−z. Stages P
and I are followed by stages 1-3 as defined above, except for the adjustments to disposable
income indicated here.
During the time interval that the household is obliged to repay the loan, non-cooperation
involves having to pay some part of the installment out of one’s own autonomous income.
The cost of non-cooperation during the time interval that the loan is being repaid depends
on the installment shares σ and 1− σ, and is thus different from that after the loan has
been fully repaid. Therefore, full repayment of the loan will potentially lead to a shift
in bargaining powers within the household and cause any previous agreement in the
allocation of resources to be renegotiated23. Following the reasoning used in the previous
section, the equilibrium allocation of resources after full repayment can be represented
by λ (k+ esL,γ, yˆe) where s is the activity sphere in which the loan of size L has been
invested and the vector yˆe =
(
yˆhe , yˆ
w
e
)
represents (stochastic) income levels from exiting
the marriage following the introduction of the credit programme.
The allocation of resources during loan repayment is a more difficult problem because,
in this case, bargaining is taking place in a non-stationary environment. Each period
brings closer the date when the last installment will be repaid and therefore, in theory,
the strategic incentives of the spouses will change over time such that an offer that is
acceptable in some period t may no longer be acceptable in period t+1. In our modelling,
we abstract away from the problem of non-stationarity by arguing that when the date
of the final installment is weeks or months distant, the spouses should bargain as if they
are negotiating in a stationary environment. In reality, a counter-offer may require no
more than a few hours (if not minutes) while experiments with bargaining games, and
more generally repeated games, have shown that subjects do not engage in backward
induction reasoning for more than a few periods (Selten and Stoecker, 1986; Johnson
23Indeed, since we have assumed that the time interval between offers is close to zero, any previous
agreement will always be renegotiated after the last installment is paid unless the initial agreement
corresponds exactly to the equilibrium of the continuation game from that point onward.
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et al., 2002). Therefore it seems reasonable to assume that when bargaining over an
allocation of resources, spouses do not take into account that each new round of a offer
and counter-offer brings closer the event of full repayment of the loan. On the other hand,
they should consider the implications of full repayment on the decision whether or not to
exit the marriage because no backward induction reasoning is necessary here. Hence, we
write the solution to the bargaining problem while a loan L is being repaid, as follows:
(8) λˆ (k1,γ,ye,L) = arg max
λ∈[0,1]
∏
i=h,w
[
V i
(
yi − z, λ
)
− V˜ i
(
yha − σ
hz, ywa − σ
wz
)]
subject to
(9)
n∑
t=1
βt−1V i (y − z, λ)+
∞∑
t=n+1
βt−1V i (y, λ (k1,γ, yˆe)) ≥
∞∑
t=1
βt−1EVˆ i
(
yˆie
)
for i = h, w
where λˆ (k,γ,ye,L) is the husband’s share in total income, β = 1 − α, L = (L, z, n, σ),
k1 = k + esL, and y, y
h
a , and y
w
a are as defined in the preceding section for household
assets k1.
It is evident from (8) that the bargaining outcome during the period of repayment is
influenced by σ and 1 − σ, the shares of the installment for which the husband and the
wife bear responsibility under non-cooperation. We can argue that these shares should
be related to the relative decision-making authorities of the spouses when they opt for
the programme, since whoever is perceived to be the primary decision-maker within the
household at the time the loan is given is likely to be held accountable (by the enforcement
authority, which may be the bank or a peer group) for repayment if an installment is
overdue. This argument does not in itself suggest a value for σ as it is fraction of a sum
of money while λ is a weight on utility, but it does indicate that the obligation to repay
installments should not significantly shift the balance of power within the household.
3.1. Participation and Investment. From the previous discussion, it is evident that if
the loan is invested in an activity over which one spouse has full control rights, this can
potentially weaken the relative bargaining position of the other. For this reason, specific
household members may prefer not to invest a loan where it has the highest return, or
not participate in a credit programme at all even if the return on investment is higher
than the rate of interest. To investigate how the spouses’ strategic interests would impact
upon the household’s collective decision regarding participation and investment, we need
to specify the functions P (.) and I (.) introduced in the previous section. We consider
four cases for mapping individual preferences into household decisions.
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(a) P
(
P h, Pw
)
= P h; I
(
Ih, Iw
)
= Ih
(b) P (Y, Y ) = Y, P
(
P h, Pw
)
= N if P h = N or Pw = N ; I
(
Ih, Iw
)
= Ih
(c) P (Y, Y ) = Y, P
(
P h, Pw
)
= N if P h = N or Pw = N ; I
(
Ih, Iw
)
= Iw
(d) P
(
P h, Pw
)
= Pw; I
(
Ih, Iw
)
= Iw
Case (a) represents the situation where the husband can always overrule his wife’s choice
regarding financial matters, which may accurately reflect financial decision-making in so-
cieties and households with strongly patriarchal norms. Given that participation in a
microfinance programme is a public and formal activity, it is doubtful that microfinance
providers would lend money to a woman without the husband’s approval as they rely
on the resource base of the whole household for ultimate repayment of the loan. Rah-
man (1999) provides a number of narratives involving borrowers of Grameen Bank which
illustrates this mechanism.
Cases (b) and (c) represents situations where participation requires the consent of both
spouses. If the credit programme offers loans to women only, then the wife must be
involved in the physical process of acquiring the loan (i.e. meeting with the bank officer,
attending regular meetings to make payments, etc.) Thus, it is reasonable to suppose
that, at least for a subset of households, the loan cannot be secured if she does not wish
to participate in the programme. In case (b), the husband still has final say regarding
the use of the loan once it has been obtained. But if the wife has sufficient knowledge
of business matters and authority within the household, she may also be making the
investment decision on her own (see Kabeer (1998,2001) for a number of accounts of
households operating along these line). The latter situation is captured by case (c).
Finally, case (d) represents the situation where the wife is able to take the decision whether
or not to participate in the programme and how to the invest the money entirely on
her own. This case may be an accurate reflection of how decisions are made in highly
conflictual households where the husband and the wife have devised a ‘divorce within
marriage’, which we will discuss further in the next section.
The appropriate case may well vary across households, and may be related to the initial
value of λ. However, since the participation and investment decisions are made over dis-
crete choices, the non-cooperative bargaining models discussed in the previous section do
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not provide any insight about the relationship between these cases and the non-cooperative
threat points and exit options (in the Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game, agents have a
continuum of choices). Nevertheless, we shall loosely associate case (a) with households
where the wife has the least say in decision-making, and cases (c) and (d) with households
where the wife has the most say. Moreover, it may be argued that if the loan is targeted
exclusively at women rather than men, then cases (b) and (c) are more likely to arise than
case (a).
Ordering of Investment Choices: The following proposition provides a ranking of all
possible investment choices for each spouse:
Proposition 3.1. (i) If the divorce threat constraint binds for spouse j for some invest-
ment choices, then spouse i prefers the most efficient investment among them;
(ii) if the divorce threat constraint binds for spouse i for some investment choices, then
spouse i is indifferent among them;
(iii) among investment choices for which the divorce threat constraint does not bind for
spouse i, he (she) prefers the efficient investment unless there is another choice for which
the loss in income is compensated, in welfare terms, by a strengthening of decision-making
authority;
(iv) spouse i always prefers an investment for which his or her divorce threat constraint
is slack to another for which the constraint binds.
There are two key implications of Proposition 3.1. The first is that if the divorce threat
constraint binds for spouse i for each of the three possible investment choices, then she (he)
is indifferent among them. This is because, by construction, the allocation of resources
within the household provides her exactly the level of welfare she would obtain from
leaving the marriage for all these choices. Moreover, the other spouse, spouse j, would
prefer the most productive of the investments as, by Proposition 2.2(ii), all income gains
from the investment will accrue to him (her). This is a special case, but it is one worthy of
consideration because, if the size of the loan is small, and the divorce threat constraint is
initially binding for either spouse, then it is plausible that the constraint would continue
to bind, however the money is invested.
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The second implication is that if there is more than one investment choice for which
the divorce threat constraint does not bind for a spouse, then she (he) ranks them by
comparing the loss in household income from an inefficient investment, and the gain in
bargaining power from doing so. She may not choose the most efficient investment if the
efficiency loss from diverting the loan is relatively small, and one or more choices lead to
a significant shift in relative bargaining powers
In the context of the empirical literature, Proposition 3.1 highlights the conditions under
which a husband who has final say in the investment decision may divert a loan that has its
most efficient use in the female autonomous sphere. The proposition indicates that the risk
of appropriation of the loan by the husband is high when he has an alternative investment
plan which can generate comparable returns, and the share of the household budget spent
on household public goods is small (as previously discussed, the latter condition ensures
that additional capital in an autonomous activity within the household would lead to a
significant shift in bargaining power).
Preferences regarding the participation decision: The participation decision be-
comes salient when the terms of the loan are not very attractive and the household has
limited scope for using additional capital for productive purposes, such that any improve-
ment in welfare from using the loan would be marginal. As with any investment decision,
the spouses may differ in terms of the discount factor or in the rate of intertemporal
substitution. But, in a bargaining context, there is an additional cause of discrepency
between their preferences, which is that taking out and investing a loan may potentially
lead to a shift in decision-making authority within the household, favouring one spouse
at the expense of the other. As a result, a loan may not be taken up even if the house-
hold’s preferred investment choice causes the utility possibility frontier to shift outward;
i.e. there is scope for diving the gains from the investment to make both spouses better
off. And a loan may be taken up even if the subsequent investment causes the pareto
frontier to contract everywhere. In the latter case, what makes the loan attractive is not
the scope of a profitable investment but, from the point of view of the spouse who has
final say in the participation decision, its effect on bargaining power within the household.
To formalise these ideas, we introduce the concept of λ-rationality as below:
Definition 3.1. An investment in activity s is λ-rational if both spouses prefer the in-
vestment to no investment if all allocations are made on the basis of a pareto weight of λ
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for the female spouse; i.e.
n∑
t=1
βt−1V i (y1 − z, λ) +
∞∑
t=n+1
βt−1V i (y1, λ) ≥
1
1− β
V i (y0, λ)
for i = h, w.
The significance of the concept of λ-rationality is that if an investment is λ-rational for
each λ ∈ (0,∞), then the utility possibility frontier in the presence of an investment is
pareto-superior to the frontier without such an investment; and if an investment is not
λ-rational for any λ ∈ (0,∞), then the utility possibility frontier in the absence of an
investment is pareto-inferior to the frontier following such an investment. It should be
clear that if the participation decision is consensus-based, then participation will occur
only if the preferred investment is λ-rational for the initial value of λ.
However, if the participation decision is made unilaterally by one spouse, then λ-rationality
at the initial value of λ is neither a necessary condition, nor a sufficient condition, for
participation to take place. In particular, if the household’s preferred investment satisfies
λ-rationality for the initial value of λ, but only by a small margin for a spouse who
has veto power regarding participation, then the loan may not be taken up, especially if
investing the loan leads to a significant shift in bargaining power.
In highly patriarchal societies, where the husband is likely to have final say in the par-
ticipation decision, he may veto participation for fear of losing his bargaining power,
especially if the best use of the loan, once taken, is to invest it in the female autonomous
sphere. The theoretical results regarding participation are summarised in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.2. (i) If the participation decision is consensus-based, then λ-rationality
for the initial value of λ is a necessary condition for participation to occur; (ii) If the
participation decision is made unilaterally by one spouse, then participation may occur
even if the household’s preferred investment is not λ-rational for any λ ∈ (0,∞); (iii)
λ-rationality for the initial value of λ, or for each λ, is not a sufficient condition for
participating in a loan programme, whether the decision is made unilaterally by one spouse
or requires consensus between the spouses.
3.2. Heterogenous Impact of Credit Programmes across Households. The the-
oretical framework introduced in sections 2.1 and 3 allow us to address the following
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question: Under what conditions is a woman likely to experience an improvement in wel-
fare and decision-making authority within the household as a result of access to credit?
Numerical Solutions: The parameters of the model provide a large set of possible
initial conditions for the household. To illustrate the scope of heterogeneous impacts, we
compute numerical solutions for a range of values of the productivity parameters γm, γf
and γc.
Specifically, we fix γm = 4 and allow γf to vary between 1 and 8, and γc between 2
and 16. We assume that, initially, the household owns 4 units of capital specific to the
male activity, and 2 units of capital in each of the other two (female and joint) activities.
We consider a loan size equivalent to 2 units of capital, which requires repayment in 12
equal installments, each worth 0.2 units of capital. The loan must be invested in a single
activity. The time discount rate for the period between each installment is assumed to be
0.9 for both spouses.
We model non-cooperation according to the ‘separate spheres model’, developed by Lund-
berg and Pollak (1993): there are two household public goods, one in the ‘sphere’ of each
spouse, and, under non-cooperation, one is able to provide only for the public good that
lies in one’s own sphere. Utility is assumed to take the same logarithmic form for both
spouses, with a coefficient of 0.3 for the private good, and a coefficient of 0.35 for each of
the household public goods (therefore, each spouse would prefer to spend 60% of the total
budget on his or her private good, and 35% of the budget on each of the household public
goods). We allow for spouses to make transfers to each other under non-cooperation. No
transfers wil occur between non-cooperative spouses if they have similar autarkic income
levels — this corresponds to case (i) in Section 2.3; but they will occur if one spouse is
much richer than the other in autarky — which is represented in case (ii) in Section 2.3.
Figure 1 indicates, for each spouse, the preferred investment choice, or the preference not
to participate in the loan programme, for different γ values. As expected, both spouses
prefer investing the loan in the cooperative activity when their joint productivity in the
cooperative activity is relatively high. For lower values of γc, each spouse prefers an
investment in his or her own activity even when the other is relatively more productive.
Only when the wife is assumed to be twice as productive as the husband do we observe a
case where the husband would prefer an investment in her activity (for an intermediate
level of productivity in the cooperative activity). From the two figures, it is evident that
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if the husband has final say over the choice of investment, then the loan would rarely be
employed in the female activity, even if the wife has strong skills in this activity.
On the other hand, if the household’s productivity in the joint activity is high, the husband
opts to invest in this activity; this leads to a more egalitarian allocation of resources within
the household and, in particular, leads to an improvement in the wife’s bargaining power
(since she is initially in a weaker position; this follows from Proposition 2.1, part (i)).
Indeed, if the husband has final say in how the loan is to be used, her bargaining power
improves only if the couple is sufficiently productive in the joint activity compared to the
male activity (except in the sole case noted above).
It is also evident from the two figures that the loan may be invested in the female activity
when γf is relatively high, and the wife has final say in the investment choice. But we
would like to argue that, in terms of the empowering potential of microfinance, this case is
less interesting: if the wife can opt to invest the loan in her own activity even though the
husband would prefer otherwise, it must be that she is, in some sense, already empowered
in terms of decision-making authority within the household.
The numerical model also illustrates a situation where the wife is indifferent between
the three investment choices as well as the no participation option. This occurs when
the level of productivity in both the female and cooperative sphere are low relative to
that in the male sphere. The wife’s divorce threat constraint is binding, and therefore
a (relatively small) investment in any household activity would have no impact on her
welfare (Propositions 2.2 and 3.1). However, if the size of the loan were large enough, she
would have a clearer preference among the different investment options.
For all the parameter values considered above, both spouses are better off, or at least no
worse off, from participating in the loan programme. To explore further issues around
participation, we consider a different case where the household has a larger asset base
(and therefore lower returns to capital) and is offered a smaller loan at a higher interest
rate. The preferences of the two spouses regarding participation and investment choice for
different γ values are represented in Figure 2 (the exact parameter values are provided in
the figure). The figure shows, in particular, a range of γ values for which one spouse would
prefer to participate in the programme while the other would not. The wife, for instance,
would prefer not to participate when there is little scope for autonomous producton for
her within the household, as well as little scope for joint production. But, for some of
these values, the husband would actually prefer taking the loan and investing it in his own
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activity. As γf increases, i.e. the wife becomes more productive in her activity, she would
prefer making an investment in her activity, but the husband, on the other hand, would
prefer not to participate in the programme for fear of weakening his bargaining power.
In Figure 3, we present the results for a different set of simulation for the case where each
spouse has a stronger preference for his or her private good (specifically, the logarithmic
utility function, with a coefficient of 0.6 for the private good, and a coefficient of 0.2
for each of the household public goods). The results indicate that when the household
spends a smaller share of its budget on household public goods, both spouses are less
likely to prefer for an investment in the cooperative activity over an investment in their
own activity.
Illustration with an ethnographic study: The stylised framework of the household
economy we have developed can account for a variety of outcomes described in ethno-
graphic studies regarding household responses to credit programmes. In particular, the
theoretical results developed in the preceding sections allow us to distinguish between
different types of intra-household relations and predict, in each case, what would be the
impact of a microcredit programme that targets women. We shall use the wide array
of intra-household relations documented in Naila Kabeer’s (1998, 2001) study of women
participating in the SEDP credit programme in the Bangladesh to illustrate the model’s
predictions.
First, consider a household for which γc is very small relative to γm and γf . Then, in
equilibrium, each spouse allocates all of his or her labour to her autonomous sphere, and
consumes the income generated in this sphere. No bargaining takes place within the
household as there is no surplus to bargain over. These parameter values can represent
an extremely conflictual relation within the household, where there is no scope for the
spouses to cooperate in a joint activity. Kabeer (2001), in providing a characterisation of
women borrowers in a microcredit programme in Bangladesh, refers to such a situation as
one of “divorce within marriage”, wherein women were able to use their loans “to create
a parallel economy for themselves which gave them considerable financial independence
from their husbands” (Kabeer 2001, p.74). In terms of the model, if the availability of
credit enables the woman to become more productive in her autonomous activity, then
the gains will necessarily accrue to her. As her husband receives only the income from his
own activity, his welfare will be unaffected. Thus, we have an example where the woman’s
access to credit has a direct, unambiguously positive impact on her welfare.
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Second, consider a household where γf is small relative to γc and γm. In this case, the
woman has few options to provide for herself if cooperation breaks down in the household.
As her non-cooperative threat-point is weak, the manmay be able to extract all the surplus
above her utility from exit. In this situation, the availability of credit will not improve the
woman’s welfare, in whichever activity the loan may be used. As stated in Proposition 2.2,
all income gains from a (small) increase in the household’s productive assets will accrue
to the man and, indeed, there will be a strengthening in his bargaining position. Kabeer
(1998) provides a number of examples of women borrowers whose situation corresponded
well with the outcome predicted in Proposition 2.2. Although the household relied on them
for access to credit and, in some instances, they made substantial labour contributions to
the loan-related activity, they had no control over - and sometimes little knowledge of -
the income generated using their loans.
Third, consider a household where γc is high relative to both γm and γf . This means
that both spouses provide valuable inputs in a cooperative activity. This may be a female
enterprise in which the man provides essential inputs like marketing or a male enterprise
where the woman’s input is highly valued. Kabeer (1998, 2001), provides a number of
accounts of marriages that can be placed in one or the other of these categories. If the most
productive use of additional capital is in the cooperative sphere, then the introduction of
a credit programme will further increase γc. In Kabeer’s interviews, the women involved
in such joint activities (in some cases, ‘joint’ simply because the woman was the conduit
for an essential input, namely credit) indicated that they played an important role in
deciding how the profits generated using the loan activity would be used. In this sense,
they had experienced an increase in welfare as a result of their access to credit. In terms
of the model, if the most productive use of new capital is in the cooperative sphere,
then the introduction of a credit programme will lead to an increase in γc. Then, as
stated in Proposition 2.1, following the increase in capital available for the joint activity,
the allocation of household income between the spouses will shift in favour of the more
disempowered spouse.
Lastly, consider a household where a microcredit loan would enable a woman to expand
her autonomous sphere, and her activity provides the most efficient means for using the
loan within the household. However, as implied by Proposition 3.1, if her husband has an
alternative means of using capital that retains his bargaining position without sacrificing
too much income, he has an incentive to appropriate the loan. In this case, the likely
end result of the credit programme would be to weaken the woman’s bargaining position
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within the household (Result 1(b) and Proposition 2.1), though her welfare may still
improve). It would be difficult to identify instances of such appropriation in empirical
studies since it requires being able to distinguish between efficient use of a loan in a male
activity and strategic appropriation of the loan by a man to retain his bargaining position.
Nevertheless, the man’s strategic incentive to appropriate the loan identified in the model
may account partly for the large fraction of loans given to women through microfinance
programmes being invested in male-dominated activities, as noted earlier.
The numerical solutions and the four scenarios discussed above suggest that the availabil-
ity of credit allows a woman to strengthen her bargaining position within the household
through an expansion of her autonomous activities in a limited number of cases. For this
process to occur, it must be that not only is the woman able to invest new capital prof-
itably in an autonomous activity, but also that her husband has no alternative activity in
which the same capital would generate comparable returns, or lacks the power to overrule
her preferred investment choice. While it is true that in a highly conflictual relationship
the availability of credit can improve her welfare, it does not, strictly speaking, enable her
to strengthen her bargaining position since there is no marriage surplus to bargain over.
We note also that for highly disempowered women, credit interventions will not have any
impact on her welfare as all income gains will accrue to the husband. The case in which
it is most likely that the availability of credit would enable the woman to strengthen her
bargaining position within the household is when capital can be invested in a cooperative
activity to which both spouses contribute in an important way.
4. Cusc

Our aim in this paper was to provide a critical perspective on the theory underlying gender
targeting in microcredit programmes and its possible effect on intra-household relations.
In the literature, this issue is often regarded as being closely related to the question
of whether women with greater autonomous control over assets and income within the
household have greater say in household decisions, while, in policy discussions, empirical
findings on the latter question often serve to motivate or justify targeting women for
microcredit.
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To investigate how providing a household access to credit affects the allocation of resources
and intra-household decision-making, we developed a simple theoretical framework dis-
tinguishing between three alternatives facing individuals within the household - exit, au-
tonomy and cooperation - and the type of production possible under each alternative.
Unlike most of the literature on the theory of intra-household allocation, we explicitly
model the process of bargaining within the household to examine how the possibility of
exit or autonomy affects the decision-making process.
Even this simple framework reveals a wide range of possible outcomes for households
provided with access to new credit. Depending on the initial balance of power in the
household and the potential of each household member to undertake or participate in an
entrepreneurial activity, the introduction of a credit programme may lead to (i) greater
cooperation in household production, and a more egalitarian intra-household allocation
of resources; (ii) greater autonomy of the woman in productive activities; (iii) appropria-
tion of all additional income generated with the loan by the husband with no change in
welfare for the woman; and (iv) strategic appropriation of the loan — or strategic veto of
programme participation — by the husband to preserve his bargaining power. The theory
can account for the heterogeneity of outcomes across households revealed through careful
micro-level studies of micocredit programmes, such as Naila Kabeer (1998, 2001) ’s work
on the impact of the SEDP credit programme in Bangladesh.
Our model demonstrates that the introduction of a microcredit programme is likely to have
heterogeneous impacts and also adverse effects on the bargaining power of some women.
Important sources of the heterogeneity in programme impact include attitudes of husbands
and wives regarding gender norms, the scope for women’s autonomy in the community,
as well as pre-intervention levels of relative bargaining power in the household. Our
theoretical results point to the importance of paying closer attention to the distribution
of the gains and losses from the intervention.24 To our knowledge, only one impact study
has attempted to consider the initial bargaining power of female participants prior to
the introduction of a microfinance programme. Ashraf et al. (2008) analyse the impact
on access to a savings product on women’s decision-making power and find that the
24This is a point made more broadly by Heckman (2005) regarding the evaluation of economic policies
in general and is particularly important to inform policy-making in developing countries. See Ravallion
(2008) for the latter point.
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positive mean impact was largely driven by initially less-empowered women, while more
empowered women did not experience any significant effect.25-26
Most importantly, the theory underlines the fact that gender targeting in microcredit is
not equivalent to providing women with greater autonomous control over new resources.
This is because women are placed in situations of unequal interdependence within the
family and have thus little scope to develop purely autonomous activities. Moreover,
strategic preemptive behaviour by male spouses further restricts women’s ability to al-
locate new loans to their autonomous activities. We show that women may be able to
invest in their own independent activities only under special circumstances, for instance
in very conflictual households, or when women are already empowered in the household.
Depending on the socio-cultural context, greater individual control over resources may
not be feasible without changes in the underlying structure of gender relations. In the
impoverished settings in which microfinance projects operate, kinship ties and marriage
play an important role in providing individuals with legitimate claims over household and
community resources, together with vital access to an insurance network in times of crisis.
Hence, cooperation and jointness of decision-making may be more desirable for women
than autonomous control over resources. In the words of Kabeer (1998, p.83)
As long as the family, and male guardianship remains women’s greatest
source of economic and social security, women’s interests are likely to be
better served by equalising the terms of interdependence within the family
rather than seeking to establish their autonomy. The mitigation of their de-
pendent status within the family so that the perceived ‘jointness’ of family
welfare and interests is more equally shared by other members is one means
by which this is achieved. In this context, [...] the notion of ‘centrality’ [...]
does seem to better capture the processes described by the women loanees
of moving from marginalisation within household decision-making and ex-
clusion within the community to positions of greater centrality, inclusion
and ‘voice’.
Holding this perspective has important implications regarding our understanding of the
empowering potential of microfinance programmes. If the new economic opportunities lie
25More or less empowered women refer to women above or below the baseline median of their measure
of bargaining power respectively.
26Note that Karlan (2007) find no impact from access to credit on household decision-making.
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outside the traditional realm of the female spouse and exit options for women are severely
limited, then she may be better off ignoring it to preserve her social ties within the
community. Thus, the empowering potential of microfinance is necessarily circumscribed
by prevailing gender norms, unless alternatives are offered to women that strengthen their
outside options in a credible manner. The magnitude of this latter effort should not be
underestimated. Changing women’s outside options requires special efforts and strong
political will, as evidenced by the history of women’s emancipation in Europe and in
developing countries alike.27
In addition, because of the possibility of strategic preemptive behaviour on the part of
the male spouse, an intervention that requires the cooperation of both spouses or ensures
that male spouses also benefit (or do not lose) from it, may be more successful at achiev-
ing wider social impacts than interventions that focus on women’s autonomous spheres
only. However, the difficulty in designing policies that engender cooperation within the
household should not be underestimated. Providing incentives for cooperation between
spouses28 can also be fraught with problems and may have unintended consequences, as
evidenced by a study on pastoral women in Northern Kenya (Doss and McPeak 2005).29
27In their study of women’s participation in economic activities outside of the household in developing
countries, Morrisson and Jutting (2005) conclude: “In sum, if social institutions in developing countries
discriminate against women, policy measures aiming to improve their situation via improved access to
education and health will have only a limited impact. [...] If custom forbids outside work for women, the
enrollment rate of girls in primary schools can double without entailing an increase in female participa-
tion in the labor market. If custom goes against accepting that women can be in a position to exercise
authority, the enrollment rate in universities can double without increasing the number of women man-
agers. These examples show that to increase the effectiveness of country and donor policies, measures
to address the institutional framework have to be undertaken” (pp. 1066, 1078). At the same time,
overcoming these social institutional constraints is not easy, as highlighted by Pezzini (2005)’s study of
twelve European countries, which shows that abortion rights and the pill did have significant effects on
women’s welfare, but that other women’s rights (e.g. mutual consent divorce laws and high maternity
protection on the job) were less effective or even counter-productive.
28Armendariz de Aghion and Roome (2008) recently conducted an experiment in Mexico, which con-
sisted in allowing women to invite their husbands to join a Self-Help Group under different scenarios.
Results from this experiment are still pending.
29The women in question required the cooperation of their husbands to market dairy milk in response
to new market opportunities. However, Doss and McPeak (2005) find that instead of cooperating with
their wives, men made migration decisions that limited their wives’ ability to market milk. Note that Doss
and McPeak (2005) are careful not to argue that non-cooperation between spouses over milk marketing
and migration decisions will automatically have a negative impact of household welfare. Similarly, it is
not obvious that women’s milk marketing plans will have positive welfare effects. The welfare impacts
of non-cooperation (or contestation to use Doss and McPeak’s expression) within the household need to
be made explicit and further explored empirically. See also Lundberg and Pollak (2003), who provide a
theoretical discussion of such strategic decisions within the household.
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A final point worth emphasizing is that, although women may not retain control over their
loans during the productive process, loss of control should not necessarily be equated with
loss of bargaining power. Instead, as evident from the formal theory on bargaining, the
relative bargaining strengths within a couple depend on how much each spouse brings to
the productive process in a cooperative agreement; the impact of a microcredit programme
depends on how the introduction of new capital reshapes household production, and
draws upon the skills and inputs of the two spouses. This result casts a new light on
complementary interventions such as entrepreneurship or business training programmes,
to the extent that they succeed in increasing the value of a woman’s contribution to a
cooperative activity in her household.
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